Forecasts of the impact of artificial intelligence range from the apocalyptic to the utopian. An October 2025 report from Senate Democrats, for example, predicted AI will destroy millions of U.S. jobs. A couple of years earlier, consultant company McKinsey forecast AI will add trillions to the global economy, while emphasizing job losses can be mitigated by training workers to do new things.
The problem is that many of these claims are based on projections, overly simplified surveys or thought experiments rather than observed changes in the economy. That makes it hard for the public, and often policymakers, to know what to trust.
As a labor economist who studies how technology and organizational change affect productivity and well-being, I believe a better place to start is with actual data on output, employment and wages – which are all looking relatively more hopeful.
AI and jobs
In one of my new research papers with economist Andrew Johnston, we studied how exposure to generative AI affected industries across America between 2017 and 2024, using administrative data that covers nearly all employers. Our analysis covered a crucial period when generative AI use exploded, allowing us to analyze the effect within businesses and industries.
We measured AI exposure using occupation-level task data matched to each industry and state’s occupational workforce mix prior to the pandemic. A state and industry with more workers in roles requiring language processing, coding or data tasks scored higher on exposure, for example, compared with one with more plumbers and electricians.
We then took that exposure ranking by occupation and looked at changes in the standard deviation in occupational exposure, comparing that with labor market and GDP across states and industries from 2017 to 2024.
Think of a standard deviation as roughly the gap between a paramedic – whose work centers on physical assessment, emergency response and hands-on care that AI cannot easily replicate – and a public relations manager, whose work involves drafting communications, analyzing sentiment and synthesizing information that AI tools handle well. That gap in AI exposure is roughly what we’re measuring when we ask: Does being on the higher-exposure side of that divide change your industry’s trajectory?
This data allowed us to answer two questions: When AI tools became widely available following the public release of ChatGPT in late 2022, did states and industries that were more exposed to generative AI become more productive, and what happened to workers?
Our answers are more encouraging, and more nuanced, than much of the public debate suggests.
We found that industries in states that were more exposed to AI experienced faster productivity growth beginning in 2021 – before ChatGPT reached the public – driven by enterprise tools already embedded in professional workflows, including GitHub Copilot for software development, Jasper for marketing and…
