What happens when a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program? Every peaceful program starts with a promise not to build a nuclear weapon. Then, the global community verifies that stated intent via the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Once a country signs the treaty, the world’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, provides continuous and technical proof that the country’s nuclear program is peaceful.
The IAEA ensures that countries operate their programs within the limits of nonproliferation agreements: low enrichment and no reactor misuse. Part of the agreement allows the IAEA to inspect nuclear-related sites, including unannounced surprise visits.
These are not just log reviews. Inspectors know what should and should not be there. When the IAEA is not on site, cameras, tamper-revealing seals on equipment and real-time radiation monitors are working full-time to gather or verify inside information about the program’s activities.
Safeguards toolkit
The IAEA safeguards toolkit is designed to detect proliferation activities early. Much of the work is fairly technical. The safeguards toolkit combines physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics and scientific sampling. Inspectors are chemists, physicists and nuclear engineers. They count spent fuel rods in a cooling pond. They check tamper seals on centrifuges. Often, the inspectors walk miles through hallways and corridors carrying heavy equipment.
That’s how the world learned in April 2021 about Iran pushing uranium enrichment from reactor-fuel-grade to near-weapons-grade levels. IAEA inspectors were able to verify that Iran was feeding uranium into a series of centrifuges designed to enrich the uranium from 5%, used for energy programs, to 60%, which is a step toward the 90% level used in nuclear weapons.
Around the facilities, whether for uranium enrichment or plutonium processing, closed-circuit surveillance cameras monitor for undeclared materials or post-work activities. Seals around the facilities provide evidence that uranium gas cylinders have not been tampered with or that centrifuges operate at the declared levels. Beyond seals, online enrichment monitors allow inspectors to look inside of centrifuges for any changes in the declared enrichment process.
Seals verify whether nuclear equipment or materials have been used between onsite inspections.
When the inspectors are on-site, they collect environmental swipes: samples of nuclear materials on surfaces, in dust or in the air. These can reveal if uranium has been enriched to levels beyond those allowed by the agreement. Or if plutonium, which is not used in nuclear power plants, is being produced in a reactor. Swipes are precise. They can identify enrichment levels from a particle smaller than a speck of dust. But they take time, days or weeks. Inspectors analyze the…
